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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH CODE ANNOT. Plaintiff/Appellant 
originally filed this appeal with the Utah Supreme Court, but that 
court poured this matter over to this Court on July 31, 1990 
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Defendant/Respondent First Security herein sets forth 
its Statement of Issues Presented for Review. 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside order of dismissal when Meadow 
Fresh's counsel and Meadow Fresh were both advised of the hearing 
on the order to show cause and failed to appear or otherwise show 
good cause for not dismissing the matter? 
2. In the event this Court renders an advisory opinion 
on the effect of Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annot., whether Utah's 
savings statute allows more than one refiling period following 
successive dismissals of a matter other than on the merits? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 4-103 Utah Code of Judicial Administration-Civil 
Calendar Management. 
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not 
been served and filed within 180 days of the filing date 
and absent a showing of good cause, the court shall 
dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of 
prosecution. 
§ 78-12-40 UTAH CODE ANNOT. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails in such action or upon cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the same shall 
have expired/ the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause 
of action survives, his representatives, may commence a 
new action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to 
comply with these rules or any order of court, a 
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any 
claim against him. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Proceedings Below 
Plaintiff/Appellant Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. ("Meadow 
Fresh") originally commenced its action against these defendants 
by filing a complaint against Defendants/Respondents on April 25, 
1983. (R. at 205-221). That case was dismissed on September 27, 
1985 by Judge Scott Daniels of the Third District Court for Meadow 
Fresh's failure to prosecute. (R. at 246). On March 13, 1987 
Judge Daniels denied Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside the 
September 27, 1985 order of dismissal. (R. at 255-59). 
Meadow Fresh appealed Judge Daniel's denial of the motion 
to set the dismissal aside. On May 27, 1987, the Utah Supreme 
Court summarily disposed of Meadow Fresh's appeal and affirmed 
Judge Daniel's dismissal of the original complaint. (R. at 
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261-62). Its order stated, "The grounds for review are so 
insubstantial that they do not merit further review." On January 
12, 1988, Meadow Fresh filed its lawsuit again. (R. at 2-19). 
Nearly one year later, on December 5, 1989, Judge Frederick issued 
an Order to Show Cause pursuant to Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration and mailed a copy to Meadow Fresh's 
counsel, citing Meadow Fresh's failure to prosecute its lawsuit as 
grounds for dismissal. (R. at 165). Although both Meadow Fresh 
and its counsel were aware of the hearing, neither Meadow Fresh 
nor its counsel appeared at the hearing on the Order to Show 
Cause, and Judge Frederick entered his Order of Dismissal on 
January 18, 1990. (R. at 180). 
On February 22, 1990 Meadow Fresh moved the trial court 
for an order to set aside this second dismissal of Meadow Fresh's 
complaint for failure to prosecute. (R. at 189-90). After 
receiving memoranda from all parties and after considering the 
matter, Judge Frederick denied Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside 
his order of dismissal on May 22, 1990. (R. at 481-82). It is 
from that Order that Meadow Fresh appeals. 
Statement of the Facts 
The law firm of Harris & Chambers (now Preston & 
Chambers) represented Meadow Fresh at all times from January 12, 
1988 to January 9, 1990. This is demonstrated by the following 
pleadings of record: 
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1. Mr. B.H. Harris withdrew from personal 
representation of Meadow Fresh because of a judicial appointment 
on December 14, 1988. Nothing in his withdrawal indicated his 
firm was withdrawing from representation. (R. at 163). 
2. On December 22, 1988, after Mr. Harris1 withdrawal, 
Mr. Harris1 former law firm, then under the name of Preston & 
Chambers, continued to represent Meadow Fresh in the case and 
responded to outstanding interrogatories on behalf of Meadow Fresh 
and certified the same to the court. (R. at 167). 
3. On January 12, 1989, nearly one month after the law 
firm of Preston & Chambers claims it withdrew from representing 
Meadow Fresh, a stipulation executed by Preston & Chambers on 
behalf of Meadow Fresh was filed with the trial court. (R. at 
175-77). 
4. The law firm of Preston & Chambers did not withdraw 
from Meadow Fresh's representation until January 9, 1990. (R. at 
171-172). 
The President of Meadow Fresh, Mr. Roy Brog, was made 
aware of the Order to Show Cause hearing in December, 1989. 
On May 14, 1990 Meadow Fresh filed its lawsuit a third 
time, which complaint was dismissed by reason of the pendency of 
this appeal. See Addenda to Brief of Appellant Meadow Fresh. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
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Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside the order of dismissal. The 
first time Meadow Fresh appealed such a denial, the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the denial of Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside 
the first order of dismissal without considering the matter of 
sufficient moment to even require briefing. The policy and 
equitable reasons for effectively affirming the second dismissal 
of Meadow Fresh's claims for its failure to prosecute them are 
even greater now than they were at the time the Utah Supreme Court 
summarily disposed of Meadow Fresh's first appeal of such a 
dismissal. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court the decision of whether an 
order of dismissal should be set aside. Meadow Fresh has shown no 
abuse of that discretion. Meadow Fresh had adequate opportunity 
to appear before the trial court to demonstrate reasons why its 
case should not be dismissed, and chose not to do so. Further, 
Meadow Fresh had adequate opportunity to demonstrate a reason why 
the order of dismissal should not be set aside, pursuant to Rule 
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In both instances, 
Meadow Fresh failed to meet its burden. After nearly ten years 
since Meadow Fresh's claims arose, and after two separate filings 
have run their course and have each been dismissed by reason of 
Meadow Fresh's dilatory prosecution of its claims, Meadow Fresh 
cannot show and has not shown an abuse of the trial court's 
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discretion in refusing to set aside its order of dismissal. 
Because Meadow Fresh cannot show an abuse of discretion/ this 
court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
Meadow Fresh has asked this court to render an advisory 
opinion on whether, assuming this court allows the order of 
dismissal in Meadow Fresh's second case to stand/ Section 
78-12-40/ UTAH CODE ANNOT.# would permit a third filing to come 
within the one year savings clause of the statute. In other 
words/ Meadow Fresh asks this court to render an opinion that 
interprets Utah's savings statute to permit multiple refilings of 
claims after multiple dismissals of those same claims/ if those 
dismissals are not on the merits. Rendering such an opinion is 
not necessary to resolve the issues on this appeal. However, the 
issue is almost certain to arise should Meadow Fresh file its 
complaint a third time. If this court elects to render an opinion 
on whether Utah's savings statute allows multiple filings, this 
court should rule that Section 78-12-40/ UTAH CODE ANNOT./ allows 
only one opportunity to take advantage of the additional one year 
following a non-prejudicial dismissal. The policies behind 
statutes of limitation/ judicial economy/ and finality affording 
potential defendants a point in time at which they may rest from 
fear of litigation/ combined with the express language of the 
statute, all combine to weigh heavily against creating a rule of 
law that would allow a cause of action to live forever so long as 
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the plaintiff continued to neglect its prosecution and simply 
refiled within a year of its repeated dismissals. 
ARGUMENT 
A. JUDGE FREDERICK'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 
In Utah, filing a lawsuit imposes obligations upon the 
plaintiff. A plaintiff has obligations to the court as well as to 
the defendants that it will pursue its claims vigorously, and 
that the case will not be allowed to languish, burdening both the 
court and the defendants. This is the rationale expressly 
underlying Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
and Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The strong 
public policy against claims having indefinite duration is also 
necessarily implied in the many statutes of limitation governing 
the timing of when claims must be brought, or lost forever. 
Meadow Fresh asks this Court to ignore all of the 
policies governing the conduct of plaintiffs in lawsuits, and to 
continue the uncertainty under which these defendants have labored 
since these claims were first brought nearly eight years ago. In 
that eight years, Meadow Fresh has now twice neglected to 
prosecute its claims against the defendants herein. For the 
reason that two judges of the Third District have dismissed Meadow 
Fresh's claims, and because Meadow Fresh has failed in its burden 
of showing an abuse of discretion, this Court should affirm the 
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lower court's denial of Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside the 
order of dismissal, 
1. The Trial Court Has Considerable Discretion to 
Refuse to Set Aside a Dismissal, 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court is 
endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in determining 
whether a movant has made a sufficient showing to overcome an 
entry of judgment, and that such a determination shall not be 
overturned without a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984). Meadow Fresh has 
made no showing of such an abuse. Instead, Meadow Fresh has 
argued that the danger of a harsh result following an affirmance 
of Judge Frederick's decision necessarily implies some kind of 
abuse of discretion. That is not the law. That a party may 
suffer because of a trial court's decision is not a sufficient 
reason to warrant reversal, especially when the decision has 
expressly been left to the discretion of the trial court, and the 
trial court has exercised that discretion after being fully 
advised of the facts and the law by all parties. 
2. Meadow Fresh Was Accorded Due Process. 
Meadow Fresh claims that it was denied due process 
because of inadequate notice of the show cause hearing. (Brief of 
Appellant at 13-15). This claim is unsupported by the record. On 
December 5, 1989, when the trial court sent notice of the hearing, 
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Meadow Fresh was represented by Preston & Chambers, the law firm 
to whom the notice was sent* The fact of Meadow Fresh's 
representation is necessarily implied from the wording of B.H. 
Harris1 withdrawal as counsel in December, 1988, but more 
importantly by two other facts. First, the law firm of Preston & 
Chambers continued to file pleadings for and on behalf of Meadow 
Fresh after Mr, Harris' withdrawal, in late December, 1988 and 
middle January, 1989. (R. at 167, 175-77). Therefore, notice 
was sent to Meadow Fresh's counsel, which constitutes notice to 
Meadow Fresh. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Meadow Fresh had 
actual notice of the show cause hearing and had opportunity to be 
heard, as established by the Affidavit of Roy Brog, filed in 
support of Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside the order of 
dismissal. (R. at 183-185.) Therefore, Meadow Fresh's 
constitutional arguments are irrelevant, and without factual 
support. 
3. The Westinqhouse Test For Explaining Delays Is Not 
Applicable On Appeal Since Meadow Fresh Elected Not 
To Araue That Test At The Trial Court. 
Meadow Fresh correctly cites this Court to the case of 
Westinqhouse Electric SUPPIV CO. V. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 544 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) as setting forth the primary factors to be 
considered in determining whether a plaintiff is justified in 
failing to prosecute an action. However, leaping to a 
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consideration of these factors ignores one essential fact. Meadow 
Fresh's opportunity to establish just cause for retaining the case 
under the Westinghouse test was at the trial court level, not 
now. Meadow Fresh's opportunity to make any facts weighing 
against dismissal of record is past/ and that issue is not 
properly before this court. In spite of Meadow Fresh's and its 
counsel's opportunity to apprise the trial court of these factors 
at the hearing on the order to show cause# it elected to ignore 
that opportunity. Meadow Fresh failed to meet its burden of 
demonstrating justifiable reasons for not dismissing the action at 
the proper time and place to the trial court/ and should not now 
be allowed to resurrect such reasons. 
a. Even if applied/ Westinghouse is not met. 
Even if Meadow Fresh had appeared at the hearing, there 
is nothing in the record to suggest that Meadow Fresh's dilatory 
prosecution of its claims was justified by any reason. The 
Westinghouse test involves 1) the conduct of the parties; 2) The 
opportunities to move the case forward; 3) What difficulties or 
prejudice may have been caused to the other side by the delay; and 
4) whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Ijl. at 879. 
Applying this four-part test/ the conduct of the parties 
element and opportunities to move the case forward element both 
weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. The undisputed facts clearly 
show that Meadow Fresh has consistently neglected to prosecute its 
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claims, in spite of the opportunities afforded by the intervening 
years and the additional time to file its second action afforded 
by Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annot. As to the third element/ 
prejudice, the defendants are prejudiced in their abilities to 
defend against these claims now by sheer passage of time. 
Finally/ examining the fourth element, what injustice is done in 
dismissing claims a party has historically refused to prosecute? 
The defendants have had to live with the prospect of liability for 
nearly 8 years now, not knowing if and when Meadow Fresh may 
decide to get serious about its claims. Meadow Fresh has 
obviously not considered its claims against the defendants to be 
of sufficient merit or import to prosecute them in either of the 
two separate actions it has brought. In light of this conscious 
disregard. Meadow Fresh's suggestion that it would be unjust to 
affirm the dismissal of its claims is unsupported and 
.unsupportable. 
In summary, Meadow Fresh has entirely failed in its 
burden of showing any cause, let alone good cause, to excuse its 
habitual negligence in prosecuting its claims. Judge Frederick 
doubtless took all relevant factors into consideration when he 
made his decision to allow the dismissal to stand. Because Meadow 
Fresh has set forth no adequate reason for overturning that 
exercise of discretion, this Court should affirm Judge Frederick's 
denial of Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside dismissal. 
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B. SHOULD THIS COURT RENDER AN OPINION ON THE AVAILABILITY 
OF SECTION 78-12-40 FOR MULTIPLE REFILINGS, IT SHOULD 
LIMIT THE EFFECT OF THE SAVINGS STATUTE TO FILINGS WITHIN 
THE FIRST ADDITIONAL YEAR ONLY. 
Assuming this Court rules in favor of the defendants and 
affirms the trial court order, Meadow Fresh asks this Court to 
render an advisory opinion on whether it can timely refile its 
complaint a third time. Because a consideration of this issue is 
not necessary to rule upon the denial of the motion to set aside 
dismissal, any opinion on the savings statute issue would be 
advisory. 
However, Meadow Fresh is correct in stating that if it 
files its complaint a third time, these defendants will assert 
statute of limitation defenses based upon an interpretation of the 
Utah saving statute which limits the "saving" of a cause of action 
to the year following the first non-prejudicial dismissal only. 
Should this Court determine that the circumstances merit rendering 
an opinion on the availability of Section 78-12-40 Utah Code 
Annot. to more than one additional filing period, this Court 
should reject Meadow Fresh's arguments and rule that Utah's 
savings statute affords only one additional filing period of one 
year after a non-prejudicial dismissal other than on the merits 
and outside of the otherwise applicable statute of limitations. 
1. The One Year Savings Statute Does Not APPIV TO A 
Third Suit Brought More Than One Year After The 
Dismissal Of The First Suit. 
Meadow Fresh has alleged three causes of action against 
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the defendants in this action - negligence, interference in 
business, and disparagement. The applicable statute of 
limitations is contained in § 78-12-25, UTAH CODE ANNOT., giving 
Meadow Fresh four years within which to bring its causes of 
action. The acts of which plaintiff complains took place in the 
months of May, June, and September, 1981. (R. at 2-19). If 
Meadow Fresh were to file a third action, it would file its 
complaint approximately ten years after the acts complained of. 
For the following reasons, Meadow Fresh's claims are not saved by 
§ 78-12-40, and this Court should render an opinion making clear 
the applicability of the savings statute only to filings within 
the year following the first non-prejudicial dismissal. 
a. This Court should construe § 78-12-40 to allow 
only one tolling or "saving". 
It is undisputed, and the record of Meadow Fresh's two 
filings in the Third District Court, C83-3163 and C88-00171, both 
establish that Meadow Fresh filed its original action within the 
applicable statute of limitations, which action was dismissed, as 
a final matter, when the Utah Supreme Court affirmed Judge 
Daniel's denial of the motion to set aside judgment on May 27, 
1987. Meadow Fresh then took advantage of § 78-12-40 by filing 
its second action within one year of May 27, 1987. 
Section 78-12-40 UTAH CODE ANNOT. states as follows: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action 
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otherwise than on the merits, and the time limited either 
by law or contract for commencing the same shall have 
expired/ the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of 
action survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the removal or failure. 
The express language of the statute provides only for Ma" 
new action, and refers only to "the" reversal or failure, not to 
any new action or to any failure. Nothing in this statute implies 
that a plaintiff like Meadow Fresh may repeatedly bring successive 
actions following successive dismissals for year after year, 
regardless of the amount of time that has elapsed, and regardless 
of the number of dismissals. Meadow Fresh asks this Court to 
interpret the savings statute so that there is no limit to the 
number of dismissals and refilings to which a plaintiff may 
subject the courts and defendants. Such an interpretation 
directly contradicts the policies of finality and judicial economy. 
Although there is no Utah case law on point, other 
jurisdictions have held that a plaintiff may not repeatedly 
utilize the applicable savings statute after its second action has 
been dismissed without prejudice. 
In United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Smvden. 53 P.2d 284 
(Okla. 1935), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a fourth filing 
was barred because the applicable savings statute only allowed one 
new filing within the extension period. 
It is generally held that the privilege conferred by an 
enabling provision in the Statute of Limitations may be 
exercised but once; that is, that such provision does not 
give protection to an indefinite number of actions merely 
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because each has been commenced before the period allowed 
by the saving clause has expired. 
1£. at 286 (citations omitted). The Smyden court went on to note 
that a savings statute does not extend the original limitation 
period, but "is only a conditional, limited extension granted 
plaintiff. . . .* Id. at 288. Other courts have similarly ruled 
that a savings statute may be used but once. £££, e.g., Hosooai 
v. Kadota, 700 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Ariz. 1985) ("A •savings' statute 
allows an action, dismissed for reasons unrelated to the merits 
after the statute of limitations has expired, to be reinstated if 
a second action is filed promptly thereafter.") (emphasis added); 
Bush v. Cole, 110 N.E. 1056 (Ohio Ct. App. 1913); Pegfl v, 
Cincinnati, N.O. T.P.R. Co. 190 S.W. 458 (Tenn. 1916). 
Finally, a recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court 
implies that a plaintiff is only entitled to a second filing under 
the savings statute, and not to continuous filings. 
[W]e have held that if a dismissal of a first action is 
appealed, section 78-12-40's extension of time for filing 
a second action runs from the date of the dismissal's 
affirmance. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). 
If this Court elects to render an opinion, it should rule 
that Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annot. does not permit a plaintiff 
more than one exercise of the extraordinary extension of time to 
file a complaint provided thereby. In the instant case, by 
waiting until 1987 to seek a vacation of the 1985 dismissal of its 
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first action, and re-filing in 1988 after the Supreme Court 
affirmed the first dismissal, Meadow Fresh actually had over two 
years from the dismissal of its first action to file a second 
time. No reason at law or equity exists to allow Meadow Fresh or 
any other plaintiff to file a third time, over four and a half 
years after the first dismissal, and years after the original 
statute of limitations has run. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, these defendants respectfully ask 
this Court to affirm the denial of Meadow Fresh's motion to set 
aside the January 18, 1990 Order of Dismissal, and, if this Court 
elects to render an opinion on the interpretation of Section 
78-12-40 Utah Code Annot., to rule that Utah's savings statute 
permits only one filing within one year of the first dismissal 
other than on the merits. 
Respectfullv submitted, 
Paul S. J^lt' 
Mark 0. Morris 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Respondents Utah State 
University Dept. of Agriculture 
and Applied Science, Von T. 
Mendenhall, and Barbara Prater 
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